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This paper examines the recent development of long-haul scheduled air services from Europe 
and identifies the increasing dominance of the major hub airports. Airline failures and changes of 
strategy have led to many of the regional European airports seeing their networks reduce in the 
last decade, while it also appears more difficult to replicate Ryanair’s use of secondary airports 
in the long-haul arena. The current pattern of regional service to intercontinental destinations is 
interpreted. Aircraft and product developments are discussed. More non-stop destinations and 
higher frequencies are expected from the major European hubs to other world regions, coupled 
with increased non-European carrier service to second-tier cities in Europe. The scope for a long-
haul  low-cost  airline  is  analysed  and  traditional  operations  are  shown  to  be  in  a  relatively 
stronger position. It is concluded that the best scope for long-haul services from the regions is to 
major  hub  airports  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  such  as  those  developed  by  Emirates  and 
Continental. Point-to-point leisure services will grow where there are ethnic links or holiday 
destinations involved. Otherwise, the regional airports are in the hands of the major airlines or 
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1.  Introduction and definitions 
 
In recent years there has been tremendous interest in the growth of low-cost airlines in Europe 
operating from regional and secondary airports. These have been entirely in the short-haul sector, 
however. This paper aims to analyse the recent development of long-haul air services in Europe. 
Modest traffic densities on individual long-haul city pairs, coupled with the use of large aircraft 
has led to intercontinental routes being heavily concentrated on major airports, mostly in capital 
cities. The limited range of existing services from regional airports is identified and the extent to 
which regional and secondary airports may take a larger share of future traffic is discussed. 
Specific  attention  is  given  to  the  impact  of  commercial  factors  (e.g.  alliances,  hubs)  and 
technological issues (in the form of new aircraft types and use of smaller aircraft on long-haul 
sectors). Forecasts of long-haul traffic are considered and the scope for low-cost airlines in the 
long-haul market is examined. 
 
At the current time, long-haul scheduled air services carry about 1 million passengers per week 
out of Europe on approximately 5000 flights (the same numbers apply in the inbound direction). 
There remains a broadly equal split between European airlines and overseas carriers flying into 
Europe. In some cases this is necessitated by the bilateral air services agreements but even in the 
more competitive markets the market shares have not moved far out of balance. A wide variety 
of aircraft types are used, although the main range is from the Boeing 767 with around 200 seats 
up to the Boeing 747 with 400 seats. 
 
For the purposes of the analysis of air services in this paper, the study area for flights from 
Europe is taken to comprise the European Union (as at July 2004) plus the Canary  Islands, 
Madeira, Azores, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. The only significant additions outside this 
area in Geographical Europe would be Turkey and Russia west of the Urals. These have been 
omitted, along with other non-EU members in Eastern Europe, because although they have few 
long-haul flights to the Atlantic or Africa, they do have a large number of short routes that cross 
into Asian Russia and the Caucasus. 
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Long-haul is taken to be the Association of European Airlines (AEA) definition which includes 
from Europe all Atlantic services, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Australasia. It does not include 
North Africa or the Middle East which are classified as medium-haul. 
 
Services are those which were listed to operate during the first week of July 2004 (1-7 July) in 
the OAG guide. Only non-stop scheduled services from Europe are included. This means that 
each service is only listed once, so for example, a flight that operates Copenhagen-London-Sao 
Paulo-Rio de Janeiro will only appear under  London-Sao Paulo. A few services are omitted 
altogether because they stop in the medium-haul area (North Africa or Middle East) en-route or 
make a technical stop only (e.g. Frankfurt-Halifax-Orlando). Code-share flights are only counted 
once – under the European hub airline if they are the operator, as a code-shared flight of the 
European  hub  airline  where  they  have  a  code-share  but  are  non-operating  and  under  the 
operating airline elsewhere. Alliance partner’s flights are only counted with the European hub 
airline if they are code-shared (e.g. Delta flying Paris-Cincinnati is included under Air France 
while American  flying  London-Chicago is not  included under  BA). Charter services are not 
included in this analysis but are very small in comparison (less than 5% of the scheduled traffic). 
 
2.  Distribution of operations between the major airlines and airports  
 
Whereas most European countries can support a network of domestic and regional air services, 
long-haul traffic is much more concentrated. The 4 major hub airports (Paris CDG,  London 
Heathrow, Frankfurt and Amsterdam) dominate the market.  
 
Table 1 shows the overall picture in terms of all long-haul services by all airlines. 51 airports in 
Europe had some form of long-haul service in July 2004. This ranges from one flight per week 
from Cardiff (to Toronto) and Hamburg (to Accra) up to 1125 flights out of London Heathrow 
(160 per day – some 22% of the European total). Although Heathrow is well ahead in number of 
flights,  Frankfurt  and  Amsterdam  actually  serve  more  destinations  than  Heathrow.  This  is 
primarily because there are more duplicated routes out of Heathrow – BA only has 40% of the 
services there and as well as foreign carriers, faces competition from Virgin in many cases. 
Heathrow also has some very dense routes such as New York JFK which accounts for 128 flights    
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per week or 18 per day. Certain US destinations (e.g. Atlanta, Houston) are still restricted under 
the  bilateral  agreement  to  operate  only  out  of  Gatwick  and  this  accounts  for  another  11 
destinations and 182 flights per week. When an ‘open skies’ or EU multilateral is eventually 
agreed, these will almost certainly decamp to Heathrow, propelling it into number 1 position in 
Europe for destinations and at the same time decimating Gatwick’s remaining long-haul services, 
already reduced from their heyday in 2000 by British Airways. 
 
Table 1 
Long-haul services (all carriers) by European airport – July 2004 
 




% hub airline or 
code-share 
London Heathrow  71  1125  40 
Paris CDG  78    806  62 
Frankfurt  81    671  69 
Amsterdam  60    480  67 
Madrid  30    276  54 
London Gatwick  32    244  21 
Rome Fiumicino  34    165  44 
Zurich  25    164  70 
Milan Malpensa  35    153  75 
Munich  33    136  76 
Manchester  18    108  19 
Paris Orly  11    107  41 
Lisbon  15      98  77 
Vienna  14      74  96 
Brussels  15      67  48 
Copenhagen  11      66  83 
Shannon  8      49  51 
Dublin  7      40  55 
Helsinki  7      35  100 
Athens  6      34  44 
31 Others (see Table 4)      327   
TOTAL    5225   
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
 
It can be seen that there is a very sharp taper as one moves down the table. Only three airports 
handle more than 500 long-haul flights per week and only six more than 200. Rome continues to 
be a significant second  tier destination. The airports the overseas airlines wish to  fly to are 
generally important as origin and destination points in their own right (e.g. London, Paris, Rome,    
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Manchester). Overseas airlines tend to avoid the medium-sized airports that are important as 
hubs (unless part of the same alliance group) e.g. Zurich, Milan, Munich, Vienna. Compared to 
10 years ago some concentration is apparent. Thin, low frequency routes from regional airports 
have been dropped to boost the flows through the hubs. The largest markets have  generally 
shown  the  most  growth  (Sweetman,  2004,  p30).  Whereas  once  cities  such  as  Toulouse, 
Bordeaux, Lyon and Basel/Mulhouse had direct flights to New York, only a Nice link survives 
among the French regional airports, everything else being forced through Paris (or alternative 
hubs).  Direct  services  such  as  Hamburg-Atlanta  and  Birmingham-Chicago  have  also 
disappeared. 
 
Table 2 shows that three divisions can be identified from the league table of European long-haul 
hub airlines. The four big ones with more than 40 departures per day are Air France at CDG, 
Lufthansa at Frankfurt, BA at Heathrow and KLM at Amsterdam. The second group of mid-size 
players with 10-20 departures per day includes Iberia at Madrid, Alitalia at Malpensa and Rome, 
Swiss at Zurich, Lufthansa’s second hub at Munich, TAP at Lisbon and Austrian at Vienna. 
 
The  major  hubs  have  strengthened  their  position  in  recent  years  as  previously  significant 
competitors  such  as  Swiss,  SAS  and  Sabena  have  lost  ground.  BA  has  transferred  Gatwick 
flights to Heathrow and Air France now has a minimal long-haul presence at Orly. Alderighi and 
Cento (2004) consider how different airlines have reacted to the down-turn in demand post 9/11.  
 
The mid-size players look to be the most exposed. Lufthansa’s Munich hub is needed in the short 
term as an overflow to Frankfurt. Lufthansa also has an incentive to keep anyone else from 
developing the lucrative Munich market. Alitalia is making severe losses and has got into a 
messy split hub arrangement between Rome and the new Milan Malpensa airport. Restructuring 
will be necessary and this is likely to see an axe taken to many of these uncompetitive long-haul 
operations. Swissair used to be a major long-haul carrier. The problem for Swiss is that it is 
losing the critical mass required to stay in the game. Somewhat against the trend, Iberia and 
Austrian have both grown rapidly in the long-haul arena. Iberia has taken advantage of the new 
facilities at Madrid Airport and Spain’s historic and linguistic links with Latin America to aim 
for dominance of this market from Europe (Buyck, 2004a). A strategy that seems to have been    
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successful – Iberia has pulled out altogether from the Far East where it was not very competitive 
and  maintains  minimal  services  to  Africa.  The  South  Atlantic  offers  the  potential  of  higher 
yields, especially to the dominant carrier and Iberia is now one of the most profitable European 
majors.  Austrian’s  strategy  is  more  difficult  to  fathom.  It  would  appear  that  the  airline  has 
identified long-haul travel as a potentially profitable growth market and aimed to capture a larger 
slice. It has the advantage of an efficient hub but with Austria being a small origin/destination 
market it will inevitably suffer on yields as frequencies are no better than from the main hubs. 
 
Table 2 
Long-haul service by European airlines from their hub airports – July 2004 
 
European Airline  Non-stop destinations*  Weekly 
frequencies* 
% non-operated  
codeshare 
Air France (Paris CDG)  65  503  18 
Lufthansa (Frankfurt)  43  462  31 
BA (London Heathrow)  46  445    5 
KLM (Amsterdam)  42  321  25 
Iberia (Madrid)  20  150  14 
Alitalia (Milan MXP)  17  115  20 
Swiss (Zurich)  18  115  24 
Lufthansa (Munich)  18  103  35 
TAP (Lisbon)  14    75    8 
Alitalia (Rome FCO)  13    72  42 
Austrian (Vienna)  14    71  28 
SAS (Copenhagen)    8    55    0 
BA (London Gatwick)    8    51    0 
Air France (Paris Orly)    4    44    0 
Finnair (Helsinki)    7    35    0 
SN Brussels (Brussels)  10    32  100 
Icelandair (Reykjavik)    5    30    0 
Aer Lingus (Shannon)    4    25    0 
LOT (Warsaw)    4    24    0 
Aer Lingus (Dublin)    4    22    0 
* including code-shares 
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
 
The airlines with few or no long-haul services have the opportunity to be niche players – Aer 
Lingus and LOT are good examples, serving ethnic flows to North America, although others 
such  as  Olympic  and  Malev  may  be  better  off  exiting  the  long-haul  sector  altogether.  SN 
Brussels may have the winning formula – not operating any long-haul routes of their own they    
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wet-lease  capacity  from  Birdy  Airlines  to  maintain  profitable  links  to  Africa  and  retain  a 
presence  on  the  North  Atlantic  by  code-sharing  on  flights  of  American.  SN  has  returned  to 
profitability as a drastically shrunken short-haul airline, in contrast to its erstwhile partner, Swiss, 
which is struggling in no-man’s land. 
 
Almost all the airlines offer close to daily frequencies on average across their long-haul network. 
Compare this to 20 years ago when SAS flew 27 destinations with just 46 weekly frequencies. 
The only exceptions to this rule are SN Brussels with its African routes at sub-daily frequencies 
and the medium sized airlines such as Swiss and Alitalia who have a number of routes at 4 or 5x 
per week, maintaining breadth of coverage ahead of density. Alitalia often has a combined daily 
service from Milan and Rome but uses different hubs on different days of the week. 
 
Code-sharing  has  become  a  crucial  tactic  to  maintain  coverage  at  the  network  level  while 
controlling capacity and competition at the route level. Table 2 shows that British Airways have 
very few long-haul code-shares operated by other airlines (a mere 5% of their total long-haul 
flights). This is partly down to regulatory constraints but also because BA’s oneworld alliance is 
less closely integrated than its rivals. Lufthansa in contrast has a third of its long-haul services 
from Frankfurt and Munich operated by partner airlines. The smaller hubs (e.g. Copenhagen, 
Lisbon, Dublin) tend to be dominated by the local airline as operating carrier, although some of 
these flights are still code-shared with overseas carriers.  
 
Table  3  examines  the  long-haul  passenger  traffic  of  the  European  airlines  (the  most  recent 
available data at the time of writing is for 2002). Please note that these figures are for long-haul 
services only (not complete system traffic). The four largest carriers are once again immediately 
apparent. Virgin Atlantic is in fifth place, ahead of Iberia, Alitalia and Swiss. Overall, AEA 
airlines long-haul traffic fell by 5% from 2001 to 2002, several airlines recording major cutbacks 
(Alitalia,  Swiss,  Olympic,  Icelandair  and  Spanair).  The  best  growth  figures  were  for  SAS, 
Finnair and TAP. bmi British Midland had newly entered the long-haul market with only 2 
transatlantic routes. Load factors are healthy: an average of 79%. The problem however is that 
only 13% of these passengers were in the premium cabins (First and Business class). Lufthansa 
stands out as having 20% premium traffic which should make a considerable difference to yields.     
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Table 3 
European airlines’ long-haul traffic 2002 
 







% of passengers 
in premium 
cabins 
Brit Airways  76  -4  75  15 
Air France  73  4  81  14 
Lufthansa  66  3  83  20 
KLM  45  -2  82  10 
Virgin Atlantic  27  -3  81  7 
Iberia  22  0  77  11 
Alitalia  14  -27  78  9 
Swiss  13  -39  80  16 
SAS  10  22  86  13 
Austrian  9  -5  78  7 
TAP  6  13  75  9 
Finnair  3  25  81  7 
LOT  3  1  86  3 
Olympic  3  -18  76  9 
Icelandair  1  -22  75  8 
Bmi  1  94  66  4 
CSA  1  4  87  8 
SN Brussels  1  Na  53  9 
Malev  1  -8  72  6 
Spanair  *  -89  55  6 
AEA total+  382  -5  79  13 
* less than 500 million 
+ includes Tarom and Turkish 
Aer Lingus data not available 
Na Not available 
Source: AEA 
 
There is some correlation between size of long-haul operation and proportion of premium traffic, 
suggesting that critical mass is necessary to attract the business passengers. The marginal players 
are mostly struggling to find 6 or 7% premium traffic. LOT Polish carry 97% of their passengers 
in economy class and bmi 96% - it is hardly worth the expense of offering business class at this 
level of take-up! Virgin Atlantic are much weaker on premium traffic than BA, suggesting scale 
of network is important. Some of the smaller  airlines partially compensate with higher load    
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factors: 87% on CSA, 86% on SAS and LOT. British Airways’ load factor is a relatively poor 
75%. This may reflect higher yields and/or less use of hub feeder traffic to fill the aircraft. 
 
Routes from regional airports and secondary centres tend to suffer from a lower proportion of 
business traffic. BA has axed first class on routes with a poor take-up e.g. London-Montreal, 
London-Tampa, Manchester-New York. American has introduced an all-economy cabin on its 
new Boston-Manchester route, flown with a 757 although this is not ‘no-frills’ (Noakes, 2004a). 
Looking ahead, it seems likely that first class will disappear from all but a handful of routes 
catering for the hyper-elite at a very high price, as the new improved business classes offer a 
very similar experience. On business oriented routes, a premium economy type product is needed 
to coax extra revenue from frequent business travellers whose company travel policy does not 
allow club class travel and also satisfying people who paid significantly more than the cheapest 
excursion fare with something better than a random seat in economy class on long journeys. If 
every airline starts offering this product however, it neutralises any competitive advantage and 
may be seen as simply an extra cost burden. Economy class is unlikely to move to ‘no-frills’ in 
the way it is going in the short-haul markets but airlines have little incentive to upgrade this 
cabin – most passengers here buy solely on price and don’t stop to think what they are getting for 
it ! 
 
3.  Long-haul services from secondary and regional airports in Europe 
 
Table 4 shows the long-haul services from the remaining 31 airports not included amongst the 
major airports of Table 1. These split into four main categories: firstly the smaller capital cities 
(e.g.  Reykjavik,  Warsaw,  Stockholm,  Prague)  where  a  few  long-haul  routes  are  maintained. 
These are largely serviced by the national carrier and one  can speculate that many of these 
continue  more  for  national  prestige  than  due  to  strong  demand  or  profitability.  Stockholm, 
however,  is  the  major  city  in  Scandinavia  and  hence  perhaps  justifies  a  higher  level  of 
intercontinental service equal to Zurich or Vienna but with the tri-national carrier, SAS, services 
have been artificially concentrated on the hub at Copenhagen. 
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Table 4 
Long-haul services (all carriers) by European airport – July 2004 
Smaller airports 
 




% national flag 
carrier or 
code-share 
Glasgow International  6  33  21 
Reykjavik  5  30  100 
Dusseldorf  16  29  41 
Birmingham  4  24  - 
Warsaw  4  24  100 
Hanover  9  22  - 
Stockholm Arlanda  4  22  64 
Prague  5  19  100 
Budapest  3  15  100 
Geneva  3  15  47 
Barcelona  2  14  - 
Nice  2  9  78 
Edinburgh  2  8  - 
Las Palmas  4  8  25 
Oslo  2  8  - 
Stuttgart  1  7  - 
Venice Marco Polo  1  7  100 
Krakow  3  6  100 
Marseille  4  5  - 
Lyon  3  4  - 
Ponta Delgada  2  3  - 
Porto  2  3  33 
Belfast International  1  2  - 
Funchal  1  2  100 
Leipzig  2  2  - 
Berlin Schoenefeld  1  1  - 
Cardiff  1  1  - 
Cologne/Bonn  1  1  - 
Hamburg  1  1  - 
Malaga  1  1  - 
Newcastle  1  1  - 
TOTAL    327   
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
 
Most of the other services in Table 4 are not operated by the national flag carrier but by overseas 
airlines flying in (e.g. Continental from New York, Air Transat from Toronto).     
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The second group comprises links to New York from smaller regional centres. New York is by a 
long way the prime long-haul destination and it is possible to support services to here from quite 
small airports such as Edinburgh, Nice and Venice. 
 
The third group is niche services catering for an ethnic demand based on past migratory patterns 
(Visiting Friends and Relatives traffic). Examples include Birmingham to Islamabad, Nice to 
Montreal, Belfast to Toronto, Hamburg to Accra (ethnic). These are generally at low frequency 
as there is negligible business traffic on these routes; passengers will fit around a once or twice 
weekly direct service from their local airport. 
 
The  final  group  is  largely  unique  to  Germany  and  comprises  long-haul  holiday  routes  from 
regional airports (e.g. to points in Florida and the Caribbean such as Leipzig to Puerto Plata, and 
Dusseldorf to Orlando). These are typically operated by Condor or LTU, the German airlines that 
used  to  specialise  in  the  Inclusive  Tour  charter  market.  Low  frequencies  characterise  these 
services (once or twice per week is again typical) and much of the capacity is sold en-bloc to tour 
operators. In other countries such as the UK, similar flights exist but continue to be operated as 
charters, hence do not feature in these statistics.  
 
4.  Distribution of services around world destinations 
 
5225 long-haul flights were identified departing from Europe during the first week of July 2004. 
This amounts to some 750 services per day, a formidable level of activity! Table 5 shows that 
60% of these flights are accounted for by the top 20 destinations with the other 40% being spread 
over 158 points. The continued dominance of the North Atlantic is reflected in that 13 of the top 
20 are in the USA or Canada. Bangkok and Tokyo are the most important otherwise. In the US 
market, there is a large fluid demand that can shift around between hubs depending on the supply 
of air services. The rest of the world tends to show more stable long-term trends. 
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Table 5 
Top 20 long-haul destinations from Europe by number of flights (all services) 
 
Destination  Flights in first week of July 2004 
New York JFK  463 
New York Newark  277 
Chicago O’Hare  262 
Toronto   207 
Atlanta  168 
Washington Dulles  168 
Bangkok  161 
Tokyo Narita  160 
Boston  138 
Singapore  136 
Los Angeles  125 
Philadelphia  112 
Montreal Dorval  104 
Sao Paulo  104 
Hong Kong  100 
Miami    95 
Johannesburg    90 
Beijing    89 
San Francisco    77 
Detroit    70 
158 Others  2119 
TOTAL  5225 
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
 
Comparing with a study of the North Atlantic ten years ago (Dennis, 1994), it can be seen that 
the traditional gateways (major cities on the east and west coast such as Boston, Los Angeles and 
Miami)  have  lost  ground  while  the  beneficiaries  have  been  hub  airports  near  the  east  coast 
(Newark, Atlanta, Washington Dulles and Philadelphia) –Table 6. Newark’s expansion has come 
largely at the expense of JFK as both can serve the large local market in New York but Newark 
offers  the  better  onward  connections.  This  has  not  been  enough  to  displace  JFK  from  first 
position however, although the gap has narrowed considerably. Twenty years ago, more than half 
the total Europe-US traffic passed through New York JFK although this airport mirrored the 
decline of Pan Am and TWA before the latest round of re-organisation. The larger European 
airlines serve both Newark and JFK at least daily. The US carriers have polarised: American and 
Delta from JFK (United having now more or less given up on this market); Continental from    
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Newark. The smaller European airlines have several strategies: moved entirely to Newark (e.g. 
SAS, TAP), remaining at JFK (e.g. Aer Lingus, Austrian) and a muddled operation (e.g. LOT 
whose flight goes to different New York airports depending on the day of the week!). Domestic 




US transatlantic gateways 
 
US Gateway from Europe  Rank in 2004  Rank in 1994 
New York JFK  1  1 
New York Newark  2  5 
Chicago O’Hare  3  2 
Atlanta  4  7 
Washington Dulles  5  8 
Boston  6  4 
Los Angeles  7  3 
Philadelphia  8  * 
Miami  9  6 
San Francisco  10  10 
* not in top 10 in 1994 
Source: Compiled from OAG and US Department of Transportation data 
 
The four major European long-haul operators (BA, Air France, Lufthansa and KLM) serve all 10 
destinations in the above list, with the exception only of Philadelphia (no KLM) and Detroit (no 
Air France). A medium sized European airline such as Swiss or Alitalia will serve most of the 
top 10 destinations. The smaller European flag carriers typically serve New York and one or two 
others chosen for their geography, ethnic links, alliance partnership or competitive position. In 
Canada, Toronto is in the networks of all the major airlines and Montreal is a favourite of the 
smaller ones (e.g. Olympic, Austrian, CSA) perhaps due to its importance as an international 
centre.   
 
The regional airports in Europe show a relatively greater bias to New York and the major US 
hubs of Chicago and Atlanta (Table 7). Toronto is the other popular one with links to 12 minor 
European airports. Apart from this there are a large number of ‘one-off’ destinations with only    
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124 frequencies spread over 48 other points, many of which are a single route operating once or 
twice a week only. 
 
Table 7 
Long-haul destinations from Europe by number of flights (services from regional airports 
of Table 4 only) 
 
Destination  Flights in first week of July 2004 
New York Newark  63 
New York JFK  58 
Toronto  37 
Chicago O’Hare  31 
Atlanta  14 
48 Others  124 
TOTAL  327 
Source: Compiled from OAG data 
 
5.  Changes in traffic and yields 
 
Table 8 shows the development in total long-haul passenger traffic of the AEA airlines, load 
factors and passenger  yields in real terms (after adjusting for exchange rate fluctuations and 
inflation). These are not perfectly comparable as AEA membership and reporting has varied over 
this time period. They do however enable some broad trends to be identified. Long-haul traffic 
has doubled in the last ten years, a very significant growth despite the current doldrums. Load 
factors have improved by 10 percentage points: we are all travelling in more crowded planes! 
Whereas in 1991, 1 out of 3 seats was empty it is now only 1 out of 5. This can possibly still 
creep  a  little  higher  but  the  realistic  maximum  for  a  year-round  scheduled  operation,  with 
availability of seats on demand (albeit at a price!) is probably around 85%. The average cost of 
long-haul travel to the passenger has fallen by about 30% since 1991. This overall trend conceals 
an increase in yields in 2000 and 2001, which has collapsed in the last two years. The strategy 
seems to be ‘pile it high and sell it cheap’! It is only in August 2004 that fare increases (other 
than fuel surcharges) are being mooted once again. KLM claimed that higher demand and strong 
forward bookings meant it could raise prices from Tuesday August 17th by between 1% and 3% 
(Milner, 2004) - the first substantive increase since September 11th 2001! 
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Table 8 
European airlines’ long-haul traffic and yields 1991-2002 
 





US c per RPK 
In real terms 
1991  182  68  6.74 
1992  207  70  5.88 
1993  224  70  6.19 
1994  244  73  5.92 
1995  270  74  5.61 
1996  293  75  5.40 
1997  322  77  5.39 
1998  345  76  5.11 
1999  373  75  4.86 
2000  399  78  5.03 
2001  402  76  5.24 
2002  382  79  4.86 
RPK Revenue Passenger Km 
Source: AEA 
 
Where  direct  long-haul  service  is  not  available  from  a  regional  airport,  connections  via  a 
European hub are necessary. Alliance development has rationalised long-haul networks in favour 
of more frequencies and capacity on sectors between key alliance hubs in different regions of the 
world while eliminating thin routes served at low frequency or with multiple stops. These are 
instead  offered  via  a  hub  connection,  which  typically  provides  better  journey  times  and 
frequencies  while  losing  the  convenience  of  a  through  plane  service.  The  European  major 
airlines have all adopted this pattern of service except where cargo traffic is important – this does 
not require the daily frequency sought by business passengers and airlines such as KLM maintain 
some  low  frequency  operations  with  Boeing  747s  to  meet  the  need  of  this  market  (e.g. 
Amsterdam-Paramaribo  in  Suriname).  Morrish  and  Hamilton  (2002)  found  that  alliances 
improve load factors and productivity but most of this is fed back to the consumer through fare 
reductions – as long as the market remains competitive. 
 
After many years of failed attempts at international mergers (SAS-British Caledonian, Alcazar, 
BA-KLM-Sabena, Air France-Sabena, Swissair-Sabena, BA-KLM, KLM-Alitalia…) the first big 
move in Europe came with Air France and KLM merging under one holding company in 2004.    
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The repercussions of this will be felt widely. In one swoop, four potential global alliances have 
been reduced to three (Buyck, 2004b). Europe’s two major hubs with spare capacity are now 
under the same control. The expectation in some quarters was that Air France would effectively 
close KLM down (despite short term commitments to maintain both hub networks). However, 
who would be the beneficiaries of this? At least part of the spoils would go to BA and Lufthansa. 
There  is  still  a  shortage  of  hub  capacity  in  northern  Europe.  Analysis  by  Veldhuis  (2004) 
suggests that Amsterdam may be the more defendable location than Paris, precisely because it is 
a smaller origin/destination market. It is quite likely that Air France and KLM will continue their 
separate lines of development – in which case why merge at all as the limited synergies could be 
realised through a much looser alliance agreement? Certainly, BA has looked at other airlines 
which offer some complementarity (including Swiss) and walked away. 
 
Where the alliance impact has been more severely felt is at the junior partners’ base airports. 
Whereas KLM is large enough to hold its own against Air France, SAS has fallen away as a 
long-haul  operator  in  favour  of  feeding  Lufthansa.  Alitalia  could  see  a  similar  relationship 
develop with Air France while Eastern European airlines are being rapidly signed up for alliance 
membership before they obtain any serious long-haul aspirations! This is likely to lead to a 
reduction in long-haul service at some of the smaller cities. 
 
6.  Growth forecasts 
 
Table 9 shows that Europe-North America is by far the dominant long-haul market from Europe 
at the current time, accounting for almost half the total passenger kilometres in 2003. Europe-
Africa  is  in  second  place  overall  although  these  other  parts  of  the  world  show  considerable 
variation by European market: Africa is very important from France, for example, Southwest 
Asia from the UK, Central and South America from Spain. Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia 
traffic is fairly evenly distributed.  
 
Looking ahead to 2023, the growth rates are expected to be higher in some of the other markets 
than the North Atlantic but the differentials are not sufficient to change the ordering by much.    
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Most long-haul markets are forecast by Boeing to grow at 5-6% per annum with the highest 
growth in Europe-China (7.4%) and the lowest in Europe-Central America (4.6%).  
 
Table 9 
Boeing traffic forecasts 2003-2023 
 










348  903  4.9 
Europe- 
Africa 




95  253  5.0 
Europe- 
Central America 
73  177  4.6 
Europe- 
South America 
49  171  6.4 
Europe- 
Northeast Asia 
48  175  6.7 
Europe- 
China 




29  95  6.0 
Europe- 
Oceania 
Na  Na  Na 
 
RPK Revenue Passenger Kilometres 
Na not available 
Source: Boeing Current Market Outlook 
 
This level of growth is unlikely to be accommodated at the major airports, all of which suffer 
capacity constraints and limits on development. Greater use of secondary hubs (e.g. Munich, 
Copenhagen) and/or secondary airports near the major cities (e.g. London Stansted and a new 
Paris  region  airport)  is  therefore  going  to  be  necessary.  Whereas  Lufthansa  can  continue 
developing  Munich  and  other  regional  airports  in  Germany,  British  Airways  has  tended  to 
withdraw long-haul services from UK airports other than Heathrow. Stansted may nevertheless 
be used by other long-haul airlines flying from abroad and/or new low-cost start ups, taking 
advantage  of  the  wide  range  of  European  services  to  let  passengers  make  up  their  own 
connections. In the absence of a third runway at Heathrow, BA may have to look at going back    
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into Gatwick or taking over SN Brussels Airlines as this is the only non-aligned carrier left with 
a potential hub in NW Europe. 
 
7.  Aircraft size and type developments 
 
The Boeing 747 (with around 400 seats) dominated long-haul operations in the 1970s and 1980s. 
In 1985, 62% of North Atlantic Services were flown with the 747 and its market share was even 
higher in Europe-Asia (Dennis, 1994). The advent of the first long-range twin jets such as the 
Boeing 767 led to frequency being substituted for capacity on the more competitive passenger 
markets such as the North Atlantic. Where bilateral restrictions limited frequency, airport slots 
were in short supply or there was substantial cargo traffic, the Boeing 747 remained dominant 
however. Some airlines (e.g. KLM, Air France, Lufthansa) operate combi 747s which reduce 
passenger capacity to 250 seats with main deck cargo space. KLM reconfigures some of these 
aircraft for the summer season when passenger demand is stronger (freight demand is counter-
seasonal, peaking in November-December). 
 
In the last 5 years, the new generation of long-haul aircraft: Boeing 777, Airbus A330 and A340 
have acquired an increasing role. They have almost eliminated the remaining tri-jets (L1011, 
DC10 and MD11) on a one-for-one basis as all fall within the 250-300 seat bracket. In a few 
cases  they  have  been  used  to  upgrade  services  developed  with  the  767  or  A310  as  demand 
grows. They have also perhaps more surprisingly been used as 747 replacements (e.g. by British 
Airways who has raided slots at Heathrow from short-haul services and by buying on the ‘grey 
market’),  enabling  further  frequency  increases.  Table  10  shows  the  long-haul  fleets  of  the 
European major airlines and some contrasting carriers from other parts of the world. 
 
US carriers have almost abandoned the 747 although Asian operators such as JAL, Singapore, 
Air India and Cathay Pacific are still wedded to the type. In Europe the large majors plus Virgin 
Atlantic continue with some 747s, while the smaller long-haul operators generally favour lower 
capacity aircraft. 
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Table 10 
Principal long-haul fleets (excluding pure freighters) - 2004 
 
  B747  MD11  A340  A330  A310  B777  B767 
BA  57          43  20 
AF  24    22   11    24    
LH  30    37    6    2     
KL  22  10          5  12 
LX      4    7    9       
AZ               9  12 
OS        4     4      3    5 
IB    6    21         
TP        4      6     
SK        7    4        9 
VS  15    15         
AA            45  73 
DL              8  118 
SQ  30      3      52   
JL  53   3        19  29 
Source: Flight World Airline Directory 2004 
 
The latest move is the use of significantly smaller aircraft then the 767 on very thin medium 
distance routes. The Boeing 757 can be adapted for transatlantic operations and is used on a 
handful  of  services,  mainly  by  Continental  (e.g.  Newark-Birmingham,  Newark-Edinburgh, 
Cleveland-Gatwick). American has recently started Boston-Manchester. It also appears on short 
routes from Europe to Africa such as Madrid-Lagos. The 757 offers the opportunity to return to 
an aircraft of 707 size (around 150 seats) but has the downside of only a single aisle with 3 seats 
either side. This creates a rather cramped impression and makes access to the toilets difficult, 
especially when meal service is in progress!  
 
Currently, there is some interest in whether a niche can be found with a small narrow-body 
aircraft such as the A319 or Boeing Business Jet - a long-range derivative of the 737 (Aviation 
Strategy, 2003). Lufthansa converted non-hub services from Dusseldorf to Chicago and Newark 
and have since added Munich to Newark. Lufthansa/United used to operate larger aircraft on the 
Dusseldorf-US runs (A340 and Boeing 767) catering for the whole market. The rationale is to 
retain the high-yield business traffic which is willing to pay a premium (i.e. the full business 
class fare!) for a non-stop service. Although unit costs are high, so are unit revenues. Other 
passengers  are  forced  through  a  hub  (e.g.  Dusseldorf-Frankfurt-Chicago,  although  there  are    
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many other options – via Amsterdam, London etc). Lufthansa is not so worried about losing 
these passengers to its rivals however! Air France, in contrast, have used their A319-100ER’s to 
start  new  thin  routes  from  their  Paris  CDG  hub  to  ‘difficult  to  reach’  destinations  that  are 
important  to  the  energy  and  construction  industries  (e.g.  Malabo,  Pointe  Noire,  Tashkent, 
Kuwait). With minimal competition these can justify premium fares but depend on feed from the 
conventional Air France network. 
 
bmi British Midland have expressed an interest in operating long-haul services from the British 
regions where  an A330 is too big (Kingsley Jones, 2004). The bmi plan, using A319LR or 
Boeing 737-700X equipment envisages a conventional two-class cabin as there is insufficient 
premium traffic on routes from places such as Manchester. This provides an interesting option to 
serve destinations such as Montreal or Mumbai but is unlikely to work on the longer distance 
routes. 
 
For the future, Airbus and Boeing have taken a rather different prognosis of the requirements of 
the market. Both can expect to capture a significant part of the mainstream demand with their 
A330/A340 series and 777 respectively. Airbus believes that factors such as growth in demand, 
downwards pressure on costs, slot shortages at key airports and an increased dependence on hubs 
and  alliances  will  push  airlines  towards  larger  aircraft;  hence  the  development  of  the  A380 
(Sweetman, 2004). Boeing, in contrast, believes passengers will want more non-stop flights on 
thinner and long-range markets with a cost effective smaller aircraft: hence the development of 
the Boeing 787 – originally 7E7 (Pilling, 2004).  
 
8.  Scope for low-cost long-haul airlines 
 
The low-cost airline revolution has so far been entirely confined to the short-haul market. In the 
USA, Southwest and Jet Blue fly some transcontinental routes but these are only medium-haul 
by international standards (5 hours). There are a number of reasons why it is more difficult to 
translate the low-cost formula to the long-haul market – although it has been tried, most notably 
by Freddie Laker’s Skytrain, on the North Atlantic, some twenty five years ago! 
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Traditional airlines in general already obtain low seat mile costs and hence offer competitive 
fares  on  long-haul  services.  From  London  to  New  York,  a  typical  winter  advance  purchase 
economy class return is as little as £200 including taxes, rising to £500 in peak season. Whereas 
in  Europe,  low-cost  airlines  have  been  able  to  more  than  halve  the  average  fare  paid  per 
passenger, the best they are likely to achieve in long-haul is about 20% off. In the long-haul 
markets there remains a significant demand willing to pay a premium price for sleeper seats etc. 
With passengers at the front of the cabin paying many thousands of pounds for their ticket, the 
marginal cost of the economy class seats  at the back of  a mixed configuration  aircraft falls 
considerably. By filling the aircraft with economy class it would be difficult to do better than 
this, especially as seat pitch on long-haul cannot realistically be reduced below the 31” or 32” 
already provided by the major airlines. On some aircraft types it is possible to squeeze an extra 
seat across the cabin (e.g. 8 abreast instead of 7 on the Boeing 767, 10 instead of 9 on the 
MD11). 
 
It is difficult for low-cost airlines to match the utilisation improvements that have been achieved 
on short-haul routes as long-haul aircraft are already flying 15-16 hours a day with carriers such 
as BA and Lufthansa, many sectors being overnight (Table 11). It is also difficult to eliminate 
‘frills’ altogether. Some form of meal service is required on flights of 8 or 10 hours – even if 
paid for ‘on demand’ the costs of the galley space and the complications of loading catering 
remain. Non-allocated seats is a no-go: families are unwilling to be split up for that length of 
journey!  In-flight  entertainment is also more important on long-haul than short-haul  and the 
number of toilets realistically cannot be reduced from the major carriers’ provision (as has been 
done on short-haul routes). Large amounts of checked baggage must still be handled. Civair is a 
South African domestic airline planning to fly Cape Town-Stansted from the end of October 
2004. Economy return fares start at £420 and do not include food, drink or headsets (Noakes, 
2004b). This is about the same price as indirect flights on Lufthansa or KLM and £150 less than 
the direct operators from Heathrow. 
 
Hubs are much more crucial for long-haul travel than for short-haul. The only dense long-haul 
point-to-point markets from Europe equate roughly to Virgin Atlantic’s network from London 
plus  a  handful  of  Paris  routes  and  a  few  New  York  services.  Other  services  are  heavily    
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dependent on connecting traffic at one or both ends of the route. For example, 85% of American 
Airlines’ Manchester-Chicago traffic connects at Chicago and even on London-Chicago it is over 
60% (Source: UK International Passenger Survey). The European airlines obviously have high 
transfer  volumes  at  the  European  end  and  on  some  of  the  thin  hub-hub  routes  e.g.  Paris-
Cincinnati or Amsterdam-Memphis, hardly anyone may be making a simple direct flight. 
 
Table 11 
Utilisation of short-haul and long-haul aircraft 
 


















Air France  7.6 (A320)  65  14.1  81 
British 
Airways 
7.6   62  12.0  75 
British 
Midland 
6.5   60     
KLM  7.1   71  15.0  82 
Lufthansa  7.1   62  15.3  83 
Virgin Atlantic      14.6  81 
easyJet  11.0   81     
Go  9.4   75     
Ryanair  8.8 (737-800)  74     
Source: Compiled from IATA, AEA and CAA Statistics 
 
Use of larger aircraft than the conventional airlines would be necessary to reduce unit costs. Thus 
if BA is using a 777 it would be possible to undercut them on seat mile costs with a new A380. 
This however flies in the face of low-cost airlines’ strategy on short-haul routes where they have 
kept to the modest 737 size equipment in order to remain competitive on frequency. Without the 
hub  feed  of  the  majors,  large  aircraft  are  not  really  a  viable  proposition.  Cargo  is  another 
concern.  Low-cost  airlines  steer  clear  of  cargo  on  short-haul  routes  as  it  complicates  the 
operation and slows down turnaround times. On long-haul, cargo is too significant a source of 
revenue to ignore, particularly if flying aircraft with large belly-hold capacity. 
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If these commercial obstacles were not sufficient, the regulatory barriers in the form of bilateral 
agreements limit the markets in which a new-entrant low-cost airline could start service. UK 
airports (except Heathrow and Gatwick) have relatively liberal access to transatlantic routes and 
some  Far  East  markets  and  the  UK  government  would  probably  be  supportive.  In  France 
however there is likely to be more protectionism of Air France! Several schemes have been 
mooted for linking Stansted with a US low-cost base such as Baltimore, enabling passengers to 
create their own ‘low-cost’ connections. It is difficult to see this being a very efficient process 
however with three - presumably independent - airlines involved! The new airport at Doncaster 
Finningley Robin Hood also has aspirations to host transatlantic services but these would appear 
to be some way into the future.  
 
The only substantial area with scope for cutting costs comes from labour. A new entrant could 
undoubtedly find staff willing to work for less, although again the differential is muted compared 
to short-haul routes. Traditional airlines often pay staff the same across the network which makes 
them particularly uncompetitive on short-haul. On long-haul, low-cost airlines would still have to 
incur some overseas accommodation and allowances as it is physically impossible for staff to 
return to base each trip. 
 
For these reasons, there are few long-haul charter flights which provides some evidence of the 
constraints in the market. The only places where charters have been successful in the long-haul 
arena are on leisure dominated routes in peak season (e.g. London-Orlando or London-Goa). 
These are reflected in the low frequency scheduled services operated by leisure airlines such as 
LTU and Martinair from Europe to Florida and the Caribbean, also by Air Transat from Canada 
to European regional airports.  
 
Although the circumstances are clearly loaded against a successful invasion of long-haul routes 
by new-entrant or ‘low-cost’ airlines, it cannot be ignored. If long-haul services (badly depressed 
since September 11th) become strongly profitable again for the major carriers then it is likely 
that other airlines will wish to get a slice of this market. If European traffic for the low-cost 
airlines falters, then it is possible that carriers such as easyJet may have to look at interline traffic 
to supplement their own local demand or even operating long-haul in their own right.    
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9.  Conclusions 
 
Whereas a large number of airlines are likely to maintain short-haul networks in Europe, long-
haul travel will be concentrated in the hands of a few key players. There are significant barriers 
to entry in the long-haul market, resulting from the dispersed distribution of demand, alliances 
and frequent flier programmes, slot constraints at major airports and the sheer cost and risk 
involved  in  building  up  critical  mass.  Virgin  Atlantic  and  Emirates  have  been  the  only  two 
significant long-haul new entrants in the last 20 years. Several European airlines have already 
abandoned the effort to be major long-haul players (e.g. SN Brussels, SAS, Olympic) and settled 
for a niche or feeder role. This has inevitably downgraded the status of their base airports in the 
intercontinental networks. Others such as Swiss and Alitalia may have to do likewise if they are 
to survive at all. The dilemma is that if long-haul services can be returned to profitability, they 
offer the traditional airlines the opportunity to participate in a more stable and less competitive 
sector of the market - hence the current growth strategy of Austrian at Vienna, for example.  
 
The best scope for long-haul services from the regions is to major hub airports in other parts of 
the world, such as those developed by Emirates (Dubai) and Continental (New York Newark). 
Opportunities for point-to-point leisure services fall into two main categories: ethnic links and 
holiday destinations (some of which may already exist as charters). A long-haul low-cost ‘no-
frills’ air service is likely to be a risky venture but carriers such as easyJet may be tempted to try 
this from their main bases in secondary airports such as London Stansted or Berlin Schonefeld if 
profits  falter  on  their  European  network,  using  their  short-haul  services  to  provide  feed. 
Otherwise, the regional airports are in the hands of the major airlines or alliance groups and their 
European feeder operations. Important links are currently under threat from lack of capacity for 
small aircraft at the major hubs, run-down of secondary hubs and competition from low-cost 
airlines for short-haul traffic. 
 
Change is not therefore complete and there are other variables that could impact on the final 
picture. If Heathrow and Frankfurt are successful in obtaining new runways, that will make the    
   
  25 
going harder for everyone else. If no new runways are built, there will be an overflow that will 
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